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Abstract
Background: In 2001, the New Zealand government introduced its Primary Health Care Strategy
(PHCS), aimed at strengthening the role of primary health care, in order to improve health and to
reduce inequalities in health. As part of the Strategy, new funding was provided to reduce the fees
that patients pay when they use primary health care services in New Zealand, to improve access
to services and to increase service use. In this article, we estimate the impact of the new funding
on general practitioner and practice nurse visit fees paid by patients and on consultation rates. The
analyses involved before-and-after monitoring of fees and consultation rates in a random sample of
99 general practices and covered the period from June 2001 (pre-Strategy) to mid-2005.
Results: Fees fell particularly in Access (higher need, higher per capita funded) practices over time
for doctor and nurse visits. Fees increased over time for many in Interim (lower need, lower per
capita funded) practices, but they fell for patients aged 65 years and over as new funding was
provided for this age group. There were increases in consultation rates across almost all age,
funding model (Access or Interim), socio-demographic and ethnic groups. Increases were
particularly high in Access practices.
Conclusion: The Strategy has resulted in lower fees for primary health care for many New
Zealanders, and consultation rates have also increased over the past few years. However, fees have
not fallen by as much as expected in government policy given the amount of extra public money
spent since there are limited requirements for practices to reduce patients' fees in line with
increases in public funding for primary care.
Introduction
In 2001, the New Zealand government introduced its Pri-
mary Health Care Strategy (PHCS), aimed at strengthen-
ing the role of primary health care, in order to improve
health and to reduce inequalities in health [1]. Implemen-
tation of the Strategy has involved three main changes in
policy. First, the government has provided significant
additional funding in order to reduce the fees that patients
pay when they use primary health care services, and to
encourage the development of new services. Second, the
Government has encouraged the development of new
organisations, Primary Health Organisations (PHOs), to
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plan and provide some primary health care services at a
local level [2]. PHOs are local, non-governmental, not-
for-profit organisations, contracted by their local District
Health Board (DHB) [3] to manage primary health serv-
ices for their enrolled populations. Third, public funding
of primary health care has changed from fee-for-service
subsidies at the practitioner level to capitation funding of
PHOs with remaining patient fees still paid out-of-pocket
to practices.
As a result of the Strategy, New Zealand now has 80 PHOs
overseeing the planning and delivery of primary health
care services; government spending to support primary
health care services is now higher than before; and all New
Zealanders enrolled with PHOs are now eligible for some
public funding for primary health care services. Overall,
the government aims to allocate around $2.2 billion over
seven years from 2002/03 to support the introduction of
the Strategy. (On 26 September 2008, the New Zealand
dollar was worth: $US 0.70; $Australian 0.83; £Stirling
0.38; Euro 0.48.)
In this article, we explore the impact of the changes
brought about by the PHCS, focusing in particular on the
changes in the fees that New Zealanders pay when they
access primary health care services, changes in consulta-
tion rates for primary health care services, and the impact
of these changes on different population groups, with a
view to exploring the implications of the Strategy in terms
of improving health and reducing inequalities in health in
the future.
Background
Prior to the introduction of the PHCS, the New Zealand
government provided partial, targeted, fee-for-service sub-
sidies for visits to general practitioners (GPs), with around
half the New Zealand population eligible for such sup-
port. Access to subsidised care was provided for all chil-
dren under six years of age, with subsidy rates ($32.50 per
visit in 2002) expected to cover the full cost of services
provided to children. For young people aged 6–17 and for
adults, partially subsidised care was available to those
with subsidy cards, either a community services card
(CSC), available to those families on lower incomes, or a
high user health card (HUHC), available for people who
had an on-going health condition and who had visited the
GP 12 or more times in the previous 12 months. For
young people, subsidies of $15 and $20 were available
respectively for those with and without subsidy cards; for
adults, subsidies of $15 per visit were available for those
with cards. In most cases, people with subsidy cards also
paid a fee to their primary health care provider. Adults
without a subsidy card paid the full cost of primary health
care themselves, which could vary, at the GP's discretion,
from nothing to around $60 for a standard GP consulta-
tion in 2002 before the Strategy began to be implemented.
This approach based on fee-for-service government subsi-
dies coupled with patients paying unregulated fees has
been criticised for many years, particularly on the grounds
that it contributed to poor access to first contact care for
some groups in the population, arising from financial, as
well as cultural and other barriers [4-9]. Surveys under-
taken by the Commonwealth Fund in 1998 and 2001, for
example, found that 20% of New Zealanders reported
financial barriers to getting primary medical care, with sta-
tistically significantly higher rates for those on below-
average incomes [10,11]. The New Zealand Health Survey
showed that 12% of New Zealanders reported that they
needed to see a GP, but did not do so in 2002/03, 48% of
these due to the cost of a GP consultation. The rate of
unmet need was higher for particular groups in the com-
munity, such as Maori (21%) and Pacific groups (17%)
and those in lower socio-economic areas (quintiles 4 and
5 14% and 15%, respectively) [12].
The Primary Health Care Strategy aims to achieve a new
vision of primary care over five to ten years in which,
"people will be part of local primary health care services
that improve their health, keep them well, are easy to get
to and co-ordinate their ongoing care" and which, "will
focus on better health for a population and actively work
to reduce health inequalities between different groups"
[1].
Six key policy directions support the vision: work with
local communities and enrolled populations; identify and
remove health inequalities; offer access to comprehensive
services to improve, maintain and restore people's health;
co-ordinate care across service areas; develop the primary
health care workforce; and continuously improve quality
using good information [1].
Key priorities for early action were to reduce barriers, par-
ticularly financial barriers, to the use of services for the
population groups with the greatest health need; support
the development of PHOs; encourage multi-disciplinary
approaches to services and decision-making; support the
development of services by Maori and Pacific providers;
and educate the public about enrolment and PHOs [1].
In terms of the funding of primary health care, the PHCS
signals a move away from a targeted approach where the
government only provides funding to support access to
primary health care for some New Zealanders to a more
universal approach where all New Zealanders are eligible
for some public funding for primary health care. To
ensure that the new funding set aside for the PHCS was
more likely to go initially to those most in need, the gov-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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ernment chose to create two forms of funding – known as
Access and Interim funding. Access PHOs generally served
higher needs population, and were defined as those PHOs
where more than 50% of the enrolled population was
Maori, Pacific, or from lower socio-economic areas. All
other PHOs were Interim PHOs.
PHOs are funded for first contact services via a funding
formula which estimates the average number of expected
primary health care visits per annum for different age
groups, and, since 2002, has paid a base capitation
amount of $25 per expected visit per enrolee (there are
also adjustments each year to maintain the value of the
subsidies). At first, Access PHOs were funded at higher
capitation rates than Interim PHOs. Since 2003, the gov-
ernment has provided further funding, gradually increas-
ing the capitation payment rates to Interim PHOs for
particular groups in the population to the rates paid for
those in Access PHOs. New funding was provided to
Interim PHOs, for those aged 6–17 years of age (from 1
October 2003), those aged 65 and over (from 1 July
2004), those aged 18–24 from 1 July 2005, those aged
45–64 from 1 July 2006, and those aged 25–44 from 1
July 2007.
It was agreed that GP practices would be able to continue
to set their own fees, even as the government rolled out
the new funding for primary health care services. New
Zealand competition law requires practices to not collude
in setting patient fees. This means that practitioners have,
so far, retained the right to set their own fees and thereby
shape their incomes, and it also maintains a degree of
competition between GPs in terms of the remaining fees
faced by patients. As a result, fees continue to vary
between practices. However, the government also stated
that it expected that its increased capitation payments
would be reflected in low or reduced costs to patients [13].
In practice, this policy was implemented through discus-
sions between Ministry of Health officials, District Health
Board (DHB) staff and PHO staff, and local PHO informal
negotiations with GPs.
In Access PHOs, these discussions focused on setting
'usual' fees within specific communities and were
informed by the Ministry's view that a 'low' fee should
generally be a zero fee for those aged six years and under;
$7–$10 for those aged 6–17; and $15–$20 for adults. In
Interim PHOs and practices, for the roll out of new fund-
ing for those aged 6–17 years of age, there was a signalled
desire for fees to be reduced in line with the increase in
subsidies (ie a $5 increase for those with subsidy cards;
$10 for those without subsidy cards). In the July 2004 roll
out of new funding for those aged 65 years and over, it
was expected that PHOs would reduce their charges for
those people without subsidy cards by $25 and for those
with subsidy cards by $10. In addition, all those eligible
for the new, higher subsidy levels also became eligible for
cheaper pharmaceutical services – with the patient contri-
bution for fully subsidised items falling to $3 per prescrip-
tion item.
In October 2006, a further change was made to the fund-
ing levels for PHOs, such that all those PHOs offering very
low cost access (ie very low fees) became eligible for even
higher levels of subsidies. At October 2006, this required
zero fees for children under 6 years; a $10 maximum for
children 6–17 years and a $15 maximum for all adults 18
years and over. Additional funding was provided to prac-
tices agreeing to provide 'very low cost access' from Octo-
ber 2007, with the aim of keeping child visits free, visits
for those aged 6–17 at no more than $10.50 and adult fees
at a maximum of $15.50 [14]. In January 2008, capitation
payments for visits for children were increased by $6 to
$45.70 where PHOs and practices agreed not to charge
patients for child visits [14].
A number of other funding sources are also available for
primary health care. In response to concerns that some
New Zealanders with high needs, but not in Access PHOs,
might continue to miss out on higher subsidies while the
new funding was rolled out, and because GPs did not wish
to manage the full financial risk of chronic illness from
their publicly funded capitation payment and private user
fees, a separate funding arrangement was established for
those with chronic illnesses. Called Care Plus, this fund-
ing is targeted towards individuals who need to visit their
GP or practice nurse often, due to significant chronic con-
ditions or a terminal illness. Additional funding has been
provided to support rural practice. The government has
also introduced a performance management programme
and funding to support clinical governance and continu-
ous quality improvement in primary health care. Some
PHOs have had further funding to support programmes
to reduce inequalities, to promote innovations in nursing
services, and to promote innovations in primary mental
health care services [15].
Overall, the government has committed an additional
$2.2 billion over the seven years from 2002/03 for imple-
mentation of the Strategy. This is a significant injection of
funding for primary health care, providing around $300
million additional new funding per annum on top of an
annual spend on general practitioner services of about
$337 million in 2002/03 [16].
Results
Changes in Fees Paid by New Zealanders as a result of the 
Strategy
In this section we report on changes in fees brought about
by the PHCS. Our focus is particularly on 'first contactAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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services' or general medical services, the funding of which
accounts for around 70% of annual capitation funding
provided for primary health care [17].
Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and 2, show the mean
invoiced fees for the patients that were continually regis-
tered with a practice and the changes in mean invoiced
fees over time. These fees are for general medical consul-
tations (ie, excluding maternity, immunisations and con-
sultations for accidents and injury, which are funded by
an alternative system). All invoiced encounters, i.e. GP
and nurse encounters aggregated, are included (that is, we
are reporting on services provided by nurses only, by GPs
only or where the patient saw both a GP and a nurse).
Although explicit government policy, as discussed above,
relates to the scheduled fees for doctor-only visits, the data
report on actual fees paid by patients, and hence provide
a picture of the way in which New Zealand patients have
experienced the PHCS and the impact of new funding on
the fees they pay each time they use a primary health care
service. The results focus on the period between July 2001
(before the introduction of the PHCS) and mid-2005.
In Access practices, across the entire study period, the fall
in fees for those aged under 6 years of age was around 8%,
while fees have fallen for those in all the other age groups
by around 20%. For those aged under six years of age, fees
averaged 50 c in 2001/02, and averaged 46 c in 2004/05;
for those aged 6–17, fees averaged $9.27 in 2001/2, fall-
ing to $7.41 in 2004/05. For the other age groups, fees
averaged between $17.82 and $21.56 in 2001/02 and fell
to between $14.59 and $16.99 in 2004/05. The range of
fees by age group also narrowed.
In Interim practices, new funding had only been provided
for two age groups during the time of this study (shaded
in Tables 1 and 2). For those aged 18–64, fees rose slightly
in each year of the study. Fees rose slightly for the first two
years of the study for those aged 65 years and over, and
then fell in the last year of the study as new funding was
rolled out in July 2004. Fees fell from an average of $26.12
in 2003/04 to $21.18 in 2004/05, a fall of $4.94 (19%).
At the end of the study period, fees in Interim practices
ranged from $2.57 on average for those aged six years and
under, to $17.07 for those aged 6–17, and to $21.18 for
those aged 65 years and over. Fees averaged around $33–
$35 for those aged 18–64 in Interim practices, that is, for
the group which had yet to benefit from additional gov-
ernment funding at the time of data collection.
When we consider changes in the average level of fees
charged by practices over time, by funding model and
community services card status (Table 2), we find that dif-
ferent groups in the population benefited in different
ways from the changes in fees brought about by the PHCS.
This is unsurprising, given that some groups (those with
subsidy cards) were already eligible for government fund-
ing to support primary health care prior to the introduc-
tion of the PHCS, while other groups were not.
In terms of changes in the average level of fees over time,
in Access practices, there were falls of between 4 c for chil-
dren with and without community services cards to falls
of $8.67 for those aged 65 years and over without com-
munity services cards. Percentage falls in fees ranged from
5% for children without community services cards, to
between 11% and 26% for most other population groups,
to 35% for those aged 65 years and over without commu-
nity services cards.
Mean patient co-payments at Access practices 2001/02-2004/ 05 Figure 1
Mean patient co-payments at Access practices 2001/
02-2004/05.
Mean patient copayments at interim practices 2001/02-2004/ 05 Figure 2
Mean patient copayments at interim practices 2001/
02-2004/05.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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New funding was introduced for Interim practices in
October 2003 for those aged 6–17 – with a $5 increase in
subsidy rates for those with subsidy cards and a $10
increase in subsidy rates for those without cards. Average
fees for those with cards rose slightly, while a slight fall in
the average fees paid by those in this age group without
cards was noticeable between 2003/04 and 2004/05
(where fees fell from an average $19.06 to $18.75; a fall of
31 c or 2%). The fall in fees was more noticeable in
Interim practices following the new subsidies introduced
in July 2004 for those aged 65 years and over, with fees
falling by an average of $2.69 (12%) for those with cards
and $10.17 on average for those without cards (a fall of
31%) between 2003/04 and 2004/05. Subsidy increases
for this group (including adjustments for inflation) were
$10 for those with cards and $25 (plus a $1 adjustment
for inflation) for those without cards.
Changes in consultation rates
Figures 3 and 4 show the changes over time in consulta-
tion rates. The data show increases in consultation rates in
Access practices across the entire study period (Figure 3).
In these practices, greater increases in consultation rates
occurred amongst those aged 65 years and over (1.6 con-
sultations, 22%); 18–24 (0.4 consultations, 22%); under
six (0.8 consultations, 19%) and 45–64 years of age (0.8
consultations, 18%) than in the remaining age group
(25–44 years) (0.4 consultations, 15%).
In Interim practices (Figure 4), there was also an overall
increase in consultation rates across the entire study
period, although the increase in percentage terms was
lower in Interim practices than for those in Access prac-
tices for each age group, other than for those aged 65 years
and over, while being very similar in Interim and Access
practices for those aged 45–64 years old. The greatest
increases in consultation rates was amongst those aged 65
years and over (1.7 consultations, 25%), 45–64 (0.7,
17%) and those aged under six (0.5, 11%).
Considering the experiences of those with and without
subsidy cards, there were increases over the entire study
period in consultation rates for all groups, except for those
aged 18–24 in Interim practices and without cards. In
Access practices, percentage increases in consultation rates
were highest for those aged 0–5 without cards (41%), fol-
lowed by those aged 65 and over (31%), 18–24 (28%)
and 6–17 (25%) without cards. Within each age group,
increases in consultation rates were higher for those with-
out cards. In Interim practices, increases in consultation
rates were highest for those in the older age groups (those
aged 65 years and over without (28%) and with cards
Table 1: Change in mean patient co-payments by funding model and age 2001/02-2004/05
Type Age 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Change 2001/02-
2002/03
Change 2002/03-
2003/04
Change 2003/04-
2004/05
Change Whole Period 
2001/02-2004/05
Access 0–5 0.50 0.44 0.33 0.46 -0.06 (-12%) -0.11 (-25%) 0.13 (39%) -0.04 (-8%)
6–17 9.27 10.10 8.34 7.41 0.83 (9%) -1.76 (-17%) -0.93 (-11%) -1.86 (-20%)
18–24 19.47 19.49 15.02 15.00 0.02 (0%) -4.47 (-23%) -0.02 (0%) -4.47 (-23%)
25–44 21.01 20.69 16.40 16.57 -0.32 (-2%) -4.29 (-21%) 0.17 (1%) -4.44 (-21%)
45–64 21.56 21.43 17.13 16.99 -0.13 (-1%) -4.30 (-20%) -0.14 (-1%) -4.57 (-21%)
65+ 17.82 18.66 16.25 14.59 0.84 (5%) -2.41 (-13%) -1.66 (-10%) -3.23 (-18%)
Interim 0–5 1.32 1.51 1.92 2.57 0.19 (15%) 0.41 (27%) 0.65 (34%) 1.25 (95%)
6–17 15.01 16.07 17.02 17.07 1.06 (7%) 0.95 (6%) 0.05 (0%) 2.06 (14%)
18–24 29.69 31.13 32.68 33.13 1.44 (5%) 1.55 (5%) 0.45 (1%) 3.44 (12%)
25–44 30.77 32.43 34.04 35.66 1.66 (5%) 1.61 (5%) 1.62 (5%) 4.89 (16%)
45–64 30.36 31.42 32.80 34.17 1.06 (3%) 1.38 (4%) 1.37 (4%) 3.81 (13%)
65+ 23.61 24.85 26.12 21.18 1.24 (5%) 1.27 (5%) -4.94 (-19%) -2.43 (-10%)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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(26%) and those aged 45–64 without cards (22%)).
Increases in consultation rates were slightly higher for
those without cards than for those with cards for those
aged 0–5 years of age, 6–17 years of age, and 65 years and
over, while those with cards had higher rates of increase
than those without cards in the 18–64 years age group.
Table 2: Mean patient co-payments by funding model and CSC status 2001/02-2004/05
Funding Type Age CSC 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Change 2001/
02-2002/03
Change 2002/
03-2003/04
Change 2003/
04-2004/05
Change Whole 
Period 2001/02-
2004/05
Access 0–5 N 0.74 0.66 0.49 0.7 -0.08 (-11%) -0.17 (-26%) 0.21 (43%) -0.04 (-5%)
Y 0.37 0.32 0.25 0.33 -0.05 (-14%) -0.07 (-22%) 0.08 (32%) -0.04 (-11%)
6–17 N 12.47 13.81 10.9 9.23 1.34 (11%) -2.91 (-21%) -1.67 (-15%) -3.24 (-26%)
Y 7.22 7.72 6.77 6.34 0.50 (7%) -0.95 (-12%) -0.43 (-6%) -0.88 (-12%)
18–24 N 23.2 24.6 17.44 17.09 1.40 (6%) -7.16 (-29%) -0.35 (-2%) -6.11 (-26%)
Y 17 16.57 13.6 13.85 -0.43 (-3%) -2.97 (-18%) 0.25 (2%) -3.15 (-19%)
25–44 N 26.17 26.11 19.88 19.75 -0.06 (0%) -6.23 (-24%) -0.13 (-1%) -6.42 (-25%)
Y 15.93 15.57 13.24 13.91 -0.36 (-2%) -2.33 (-15%) 0.67 (5%) -2.02 (-13%)
45–64 N 25.54 25.33 19.43 19.22 -0.21 (-1%) -5.90 (-23%) -0.21 (-1%) -6.32 (-25%)
Y 16.43 16.25 14.04 14.14 -0.18 (-1%) -2.21 (-14%) 0.10 (1%) -2.29 (-14%)
65+ N 24.77 25 19.88 16.1 0.23 (1%) -5.12 (-20%) -3.78 (-19%) -8.67 (-35%)
Y 15.8 16.65 15.03 14.08 0.85 (5%) -1.62 (-10%) -0.95 (-6%) -1.72 (-11%)
Interim 0–5 N 1.64 2 2.61 3.33 0.36 (22%) 0.61 (31%) 0.72 (28%) 1.69 (103%)
Y 0.93 0.94 1.08 1.59 0.01 (1%) 0.14 (15%) 0.51 (47%) 0.66 (71%)
6–17 N 16.95 18.26 19.06 18.75 1.31 (8%) 0.80 (4%) -0.31 (-2%) 1.80 (11%)
Y 12.5 13.26 14.43 14.91 0.76 (6%) 1.17 (9%) 0.48 (3%) 2.41 (19%)
18–24 N 32.69 35.01 36.76 37.02 2.32 (7%) 1.75 (5%) 0.26 (1%) 4.33 (13%)
Y 26.04 27.19 29.02 30.01 1.15 (4%) 1.83 (7%) 0.99 (3%) 3.97 (15%)
25–44 N 33.95 35.99 37.51 39.08 2.04 (6%) 1.52 (4%) 1.57 (4%) 5.13 (15%)
Y 24.42 25.52 27.5 29.44 1.10 (5%) 1.98 (8%) 1.94 (7%) 5.02 (21%)
45–64 N 33.17 34.3 35.57 37.04 1.13 (3%) 1.27 (4%) 1.47 (4%) 3.87 (12%)
Y 23.39 24.09 25.65 26.82 0.70 (3%) 1.56 (6%) 1.17 (5%) 3.43 (15%)
65+ N 30.99 32.21 33.01 22.84 1.22 (4%) 0.80 (2%) -10.17 (-31%) -8.15 (-26%)
Y 20.59 21.77 23.09 20.4 1.18 (6%) 1.32 (6%) -2.69 (-12%) -0.19 (-1%)Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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Discussion
Main findings in relation to government objectives: fees
As a result of the additional public funding for primary
health care, fees fell particularly in Access practices for
doctor and nurse visits. Fees have increased over time for
many in Interim practices, but they fell for those aged 65
years and over as new funding was provided for this age
group in Interim practices. Thus, at one level, the govern-
ment's goal of increasing funding to PHOs in order to
reduce the fees patients pay was achieved – fees generally
fell where one would have expected them to fall (for those
in Access practices and for those aged 65 years and over in
Interim practices).
For patients in Access practices, and for those in Interim
practices aged 6–17 and 65 years and over (who were eli-
gible for the extra public funding for longest), a key ques-
tion is whether the changes in fees met the scale of fee
reductions the government was looking for. The general
expectation was that fees should be 'low' or reduce as new
funding became available. In Access practices, the govern-
ment was looking for a zero fee for those aged six years
and under; $7–$10 for those aged 6–17; and $15–$20 for
adults. Fees clearly fell in Access practices over the study
period. By the end, average fees in Access practices were 46
c for those six years and under; $7.41 for those aged 6–17;
and below $20 for adults. Thus, the government's policy
objectives were close to being met for younger children in
Access practices and were being met for those aged 6–17
years and for adults.
In terms of Interim practice patients, the data show that
the new funding to those aged 6–17 led to only a small
reduction in the overall fees paid by those without subsidy
cards and a small increase in fees paid by those with cards.
Part of the explanation for fees not reducing much in this
group relates to the fact that the new funding came to only
around $5 (for those with cards) to $10 (for those without
cards) per consultation, as before the PHCS those in this
age group had already received a government subsidy for
primary health care of $20 and $15, respectively. Reduc-
tions in fees for those aged 65 years and over were much
greater: in the year after they became eligible, fees for doc-
tor and nurse visits fell by an average of $10.17 (31%) for
those aged 65 years and over without cards and $2.69
(12%) for those with cards. The government had been
seeking greater falls in schedule fees of around $25 for
those without cards and of $10 for those with cards.
In interpreting these findings, it is important to remember
that the data relate to the fees charged to patients, whereas
government policy focused on schedule fees; i.e. the fees
that are set out in schedules and displayed in offices to
inform patients of the fees charged for standard consulta-
tions. If scheduled fees did fall by the amounts required
by the government, our findings reflect considerable dif-
ferences between scheduled and actual fees charged to
patients. This may arise from consultations being shorter
than the standard consultation assumed to calculate the
scheduled fees, or from greater nurse or other provider
involvement in consultations than for a standard consul-
tation, or as a result of significant amounts of pre-PHCS
discounting of fees by general practices. Our findings also
relate to both doctor and nurse visits, while the explicit
government policy was focused on doctor visits only;
however, additional analyses using data on doctor visits
only shows a similar pattern of changes in fees as for doc-
tor and nurse visits combined (not shown) [18].
Although the government signalled that it wished to see
fees for those with and without subsidy cards to be the
Consultation rates at Access practices 2001/02-2004/05 Figure 3
Consultation rates at Access practices 2001/02-2004/
05.
Consultation rates at Interim practices 2001/02-2004/05 Figure 4
Consultation rates at Interim practices 2001/02-
2004/05.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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same, our results also show that those with cards were
charged lower fees than those without cards in both
Access and Interim practices (Table 2). This is likely to rep-
resent the persistence of longstanding practitioner behav-
iour under the previous targeted subsidy regime in which
practitioners took account of what they supposed to be
the financial circumstances of different patients when
charging them. The continuation of such behaviour may
work in an unplanned way towards reducing inequalities
in access to health services (and thence perhaps to reduced
health inequalities) by enabling even cheaper access to
care for more disadvantaged groups. On the other hand,
the reductions in fees, as opposed to the total fees charged,
have tended to benefit those without the previous subsidy
cards. In Access practices, much of the benefit of the new
funding is, as expected, going to those without subsidy
cards while in Interim practices, fees are generally not ris-
ing as fast for those without cards, i.e. benefiting those in
better socio-economic positions (except for children). For
example, fees have fallen further for those aged 65 years
and over without cards. This is because the aim of policy
since 2001 has been to relate public funding for primary
health care more closely to those who need care rather
than to target it on those with the lowest incomes or high-
est level of past use as under the pre-PHCS approach.
With almost all practices becoming members of PHOs
and with almost all New Zealanders now enrolled in a
PHO, there is no definitive way of knowing how fees
might have changed in the absence of increased funding
for primary health care. Recent research by Cumming and
Stillman (personal communication, J Cumming and S
Stillman) shows that nominal fees paid by patients rose
by 40% between 1996/97 and 2002/03, i.e. at around 6%
per annum, across all population groups. Assuming that
the 1996/97-2002/03 period is typical of trends in the
costs of general practice services before the PHCS was
implemented, we might have expected fees to have risen
by around 6% per annum in the absence of the PHCS, or
by around 18% over the 2001/02-2004/05 period.
Instead, the results show that fees fell in Access practices
as they became part of PHOs by between 8% and 20%
between 2001/02 and 2004/05, when we might have
expected fees to have risen over this period by around
18%.
In Interim practices, other than for children, fee increases
across the study period were broadly within the likely 6%
per annum increase that would have been expected with-
out the PHCS, though fee increases were possibly lower
than might have been expected between 2002/03 and
2003/04. However, over the entire period, fees fell to the
extent that might have been expected for those aged 6–17,
while they fell for those aged 65 years and over (by
between 12% and 33%, when an overall increase of about
18% might have been expected). All the fee reductions or
reduced rates of increase were achieved with the injection
of a large amount of new public funding.
Of particular interest in these analyses is the overall
impact of the changes on provider incomes, particularly
GP practice incomes. Government policy has tended to
tighten over time in order to alleviate concerns that the
new funding could have resulted not in lower fees for
patients, but in higher incomes for providers. The evi-
dence reported here does show that not all the increase in
government funding was reflected in reduced fees for
patients. Survey evidence from other parts of our evalua-
tion of the PHCS shows that 72% of practices sampled (n
= 276) reported an increase in their income since joining
a PHO (compared with 7% which reported a decrease),
with higher incomes more likely to be reported by Interim
practices (83%) (whose enrolees were not yet all entitled
to government subsidies for primary health care) com-
pared with Access practices (51%) (whose populations
were by then fully covered by the new funding arrange-
ments) [19]. Other evidence from a smaller sample of
general practices similarly shows an increase in median
nominal net profit per working owner from $97,220 in
2002 (n = 114) to $153,886 in 2005 (n = 79) [20,21].
Some commentators have argued, however, that this
increase in incomes is no bad thing, given previous con-
cerns over the recruitment and retention of GPs in New
Zealand.
It may also be the case that the increase in public funding
is not exactly reflected in reduced patient out-of-pocket
fees for other reasons. The length or nature of consulta-
tions may have changed over time; new funding could be
being used to pay for higher overall practice costs; or the
number of visits and workloads of practices may have
increased. Indeed, 73% of practices in the above practice
survey also reported being busier than they had been
before joining a PHO [19] and the research reported in the
current article also shows an increase in consultation rates
(in part related to the decrease in user fees), so that some
of the increase in incomes may well be as a result of
increased work undertaken by practices.
Main findings in relation to government objectives: 
consultation rates
In terms of consultations, it appears that the government's
aim of increasing consultation rates for primary health
care was achieved. There were increases in consultation
rates across almost all age, funding model, subsidy card
and ethnic groups. Increases were particularly high in
Access practices, especially for those without community
services cards; and for those aged 65 years with and with-
out community services cards and those aged 45–64 with
community services cards in Interim practices. Consulta-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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tion rates increased for all ethnic groups, with similar
increases for Pacific, Maori, and European and 'Other' eth-
nic groups, and smaller increases for Asian populations.
The overall increase in average consultation rates appears
to be reasonable in terms of the number of consultations,
with increases of over 20% for some in Access practices.
Increases in Interim practices were generally lower, as
might have been expected given that new funding had not
been allocated to all groups in Interim practices through-
out the study period, although consultation rates in
Interim practices increased by more than 20% for those
aged 45–64 without community cards and for those aged
65 years and over with and without cards.
The increase in consultation rates does seem to be associ-
ated with a reduction in unmet need for primary health
care. Recent evidence from the 2006/07 New Zealand
Health Survey shows that New Zealanders' unmet need, as
demonstrated by the percentage of people reporting want-
ing to visit a primary health care provider but not being
able to do so, has fallen over the period since the imple-
mentation of the Strategy began, from 12% in 2002/03 to
6.3% in 2006/07 [22,23].
Conclusion
New Zealand's Primary Health Care Strategy resulted in
lower fees for primary health care for many New Zealand-
ers, and consultation rates also increased. However, fees
did not fall by as much as expected in government policy
statements, and greater reductions in fees occurred in
groups in the population who might be considered to be
in a better financial position.
The government now needs to find a way to assess the
benefits of the improved access and higher utilisation it
has obtained from the substantial increase in its expendi-
ture over the past few years to assure itself that the Strategy
is providing value for money, and contributing to improv-
ing health and reducing health inequalities as originally
intended. Then the government needs to develop the pay-
ment system to encourage the provision of more primary
care that improves health and reduces inequalities.
Another key issue for the government is how to explicitly
define and maintain low fees (i.e. fee levels that do not
deter any sub-group in the population from making
timely, effective use of first contact primary health care)
when it does not fully fund primary health care, and while
ensuring that public funding legitimately compensates for
the increasing costs faced by health professionals and pro-
vides them with a reasonable, but not excessive take-
home income sufficient to ensure an adequate supply of
medical and nursing staff across the country. Compared
with earlier policy settings, New Zealand now has better
mechanisms to manage the fees that patients pay, includ-
ing fees review processes where local fees are perceived to
be too high and the agreed capping of fees where provid-
ers accept higher levels of capitation payment. However,
there are limited requirements for practitioners to pass on
increased public funding to patients in the shape of
reduced user fees. By contrast, providers will have con-
cerns about the impact of fee agreement and review proc-
esses on their ability to set fees and hence to recover
increasing costs, earn higher incomes (including where
they do extra work) and maintain the value of their busi-
nesses. As a result, each new allocation of public funding
is likely to result in policy debate over the balance
between maintaining or reducing patient fees and reward-
ing professionals for their contribution to New Zealand-
ers' health.
Methods
This article is focused on the period from June 2001 until
mid – 2005. It provides data on fees and use of services
covered by:
￿ the year before the first PHO was established in July
2002
￿ the roll out of new funding for Access PHOs as they were
established after July 2002
￿ the roll out of new funding to Interim PHOs as they were
established, and
￿ the roll out of new funding to Interim PHOs for those
aged 6–17 in October 2003 and those aged 65 years and
over in July 2004.
While government policy during the period focused on
changes in scheduled fees, that is on the fees doctors
advertised for standard consultations, the analyses here
focus on fees actually paid by patients for their consulta-
tions with both doctors and nurses (for doctor consulta-
tions, we see a similar pattern of fees, not reported here)
[18].
The research uses a before-and-after design to explore the
changes occurring in fees and consultation rates. A power
analysis showed that a sample of 100 general practices
would provide adequate power to address key research
questions, based upon known distributions of variables of
interest. A national sample of 100 practices was drawn
from lists of all currently active practices that are members
of PHOs. Practices were invited to take part in the
research, and paid $250 for participation. Practices were
offered the opportunity to receive analyses comparing
their fees and, patterns of utilisation with all other prac-
tices sampled. Overall, 100 out of 115 practicesAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:24 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/24
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approached to participate did so (87%). However, data
from one practice proved to be unuseable, leaving a sam-
ple of 99 practices.
The total population of registered patients in the final
sample was 421,993, or 10.4% of the NZ population. As
a result of some practices not participating in the research,
the sample over-sampled Access practices.
The data collected were:
 A register download of registration status, date of birth,
gender, ethnicity, deprivation code, current subsidy card
status.
 Dates of consultations since 1 June 2001.
 The practitioner (doctor or nurse) seen at each encounter.
 Information on the fees charged to patients for each con-
sultation.
A number of technical issues also arose in undertaking
these analyses. First, when reporting co-payments, there is
a wide range of services provided by primary health care
providers. Some minor surgical procedures cost hundreds
of dollars (e.g. a vasectomy); other invoices show negative
amounts, corresponding to a refund being issued to a
patient. To eliminate the impact of extreme outliers, the
co-payments data were censored, restricting co-payments
to values between $0 and $100. Second, we needed to rec-
ognise the difference between invoiced encounters and
encounters for which there was no associated invoice. All
data presented in the graphs and tables are for invoiced
encounters only (which includes invoices where the
charge is $0). For an invoiced encounter to be recorded
when a patient fee is not charged, a "zero invoice" must be
entered. This is typically for visits by young children or for
people who use a lot of services, such as the elderly or
patients with chronic conditions, and for visits to a prac-
tice nurse. However, "zero invoice" information is not
entered reliably into practice management systems, and
data collections based on invoiced encounters may there-
fore tend to underestimate overall consultation rates.
Ethics Approval was given for the study by the New Zea-
land Multi Region Ethics Committee. A Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the researchers and
each participating practice, describing data collection and
analysis procedures.
Limitations of the study
First, we have no way of taking account of the content of
consultations. We censored the fees data in order to
reduce the impact of higher cost services on the analyses,
but even then, the fees reported may represent a wide
range of different types of consultations, including the
provision of special procedures or a number of services at
one visit, or a longer consultation. The estimates of
changes over time in relation to fees and consultations
also assume that there was no change in the nature or
length of consultations.
Second, not all encounters have an associated invoice and
we may have under-estimated the number of consulta-
tions taking place as a result of this (e.g., consultations for
young children, nurses visits, or visits by high users, as
well as consultations for repeat prescriptions attract an
invoice). We may therefore have over-estimated the aver-
age fees paid by patients, as encounters where there is no
invoice generated have not been included in the calcula-
tions of average fees (although encounters where a zero
invoice was noted are included).
Third, of necessity, there is no control group with which
to compare experiences. We cannot be sure what might
have happened to both fees and consultation rates in the
absence of the PHCS and of new funding allocated by gov-
ernment to primary health care. We have indicated how
fees may have changed in the absence of the PHCS, but
this can only be an estimate.
Fourth, our findings are based on an analysis of data from
99 general practices. The sample slightly over-represents
Access practices. We have also had to limit the data to
patients who were registered with a particular practice at
the time of this analysis. Patients who shifted between
practices may differ. Our analyses by subsidy card popula-
tion groups are also dependent on data availability. The
analyses here assign a subsidy card to anyone who ever
held a card. The analyses may therefore classify some peo-
ple who no longer have or are eligible for cards within the
card-holding group.
Finally, there are potential gaps in our dataset. There may
be some services which are not recorded here, either
because they are organised by the PHOs or because not all
services delivered by practices are recorded. Changes in
recording may also impact on our findings (for example,
nursing services may simply be being recorded more).
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